In recent years, employees have been shouldering an increasing share of the costs of employee-provided health care. At the same time, more and more employers have been allowing employees to pay their out-of-pocket health care costs using pre-tax earnings, through tax-subsidized ‡exible spending accounts (FSAs). We use a cross-section of …rm-level data from 1993 to show empirically that these FSAs can explain a signi…cant fraction of the shift in health care costs to employees, and that this shift is e¢ cient, given the distortionary e¤ects of the existing tax-subsidy to premiums. Correcting for selection e¤ects, we …nd that FSAs are associated with insurance contracts with coinsurance rates that are about 7 percentage points higher, relative to a sample average coinsurance rate of 17 percent. In addition, coinsurance rates net of the subsidy, are themselves higher by about 2 percentage points, providing evidence that FSAs are welfareenhancing.
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of the costs of health care. For example, CPS data indicate that the share workers with employer-provided health insurance who paid no portion of the premium fell from 44% in 1982 to 28% in 1998 (Gruber and McKnight, 2003) . In addition, more than half (51%) of large …rms survey in 2003 were very likely to increase the share of premiums paid by their employees, while 15% intended to increase employees'coinsurance rates, and 20% expected to increase out-ofpocket payments for prescription drugs. Between 2001 and 2004 coinsurance rates for prescription drugs rose from 18 to 20 percent for generics, 21 to 26 percent for preferred drugs (i.e., those included on a formulary list), and from 24 to 31 percent for non-preferred drugs (Kaiser Family Foundation and HRET, 2004, page 116).
Employees bear insurance costs either by sharing (nominally) in the payment of premiums, 1 or by being exposed to out-of-pocket costs when they consume medical care services, and the examples above indicate that changes are occurring on both these margins. Some attention has been given in the literature to the increase in the …rst component (the share of premiums), focusing on changes in tax rates, demographic trends, and eligibility for public insurance such as Medicaid (Gruber and McKnight, 2003) . In this paper, we focus on the second component -out-of-pocket costs borne by employees. We examine the extent to which tax policy, in the form of ‡exible spending accounts, can account for the pattern of out-of-pocket costs, and we consider the e¢ ciency properties of the subsidy.
Employer-provided health insurance was …rst subsidized through the tax system with the passage of Section 106 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Service Act. The act exempts health insurance premiums paid by the employer on behalf of an employee from the employee's taxable income (for the purposes of calculating both personal and FICA 2 taxes). As purchases of health insurance are e¤ectively subsidized at the employee's marginal income tax rate, it is widely believed (e.g., Pauly, 1986 ) that the subsidy induces individuals to buy insurance through their employers, and to buy more generous insurance than they otherwise would. 3 In 1978, Section 125 of the Internal Revenue Code extended the exemption to certain employee out-of-pocket health expenditures. In practice, premium payments nominally made by an employee are not included in taxable income, so that the full premium receives a subsidy at the employee's marginal tax rate, independent of whether it is paid by the employer or employee.
The extension of the subsidy under Section 125 was not, however, limited to premium payments. Under the Act, other out-of-pocket health expenditures were made excludable from taxable income, although the exclusion of uninsured
expenses is not open-ended. Individuals who are o¤ered access to so-called Flexible Spending Accounts (FSAs) can make annual contributions from pre-tax income, up to a certain dollar limit (in 2004, the limit was $6,500). These taxfree funds can be used to o¤set quali…ed medical expenses, including deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance obligations that are part of an insurance policy, or simply to pay for other uninsured medical expenses. 4 As marginal tax rates have fallen since the late 1970s, the incentives to purchase plans that cover a large share of incurred costs have been attenuated, which could explain the shift towards higher out-of-pocket expenditures. At the same time, the use of FSAs has also grown. According to the 1993 Robert Wood Johnson Employer-Provided Health Insurance survey, about 22 percent of employers o¤ered an FSA in 1993. The Kaiser Family Foundation reports the share of employers o¤ering FSAs in 2003 by …rm size, and …nds values of 83 percent for very large …rms (up from 69 percent in 1999), 76 percent for large …rms, 57 percent for midsize …rms, and 14 percent for small …rms. Government spending due to FSAs is signi…cant. Federal tax expenditures as a result of the FSA provision were estimated at more than $11 billion in 1993, and $15 billion in 2001. 5 Few studies have investigated the e¤ects of FSAs on employer-provided health insurance. Levy (1998) argues that a …rm is more likely to o¤er an FSA if it employs more workers with a high demand for insurance. She also …nds that, for …rms that o¤er FSAs, employee premium contributions increase with the marginal tax rate. Cardon and Showalter (2001) examine the determinants of employee participation in an FSA program. Their …ndings suggest that participation in an FSA program increases with income and to a certain extent the foreknowledge of medical expenditures. Dowd, Feldman, Maciejewski, and Pauly (2001) study the e¤ects of Section 125, but focus on the subsidy to employee-paid premiums, instead of the subsidy to out-of-pocket expenses. They …nd that the employee-paid premium subsidy, like the exclusion of employer-paid premiums, distorts employees'insurance decisions. Our study is one of the …rst to investigate empirically the e¤ect of the subsidy to uninsured expenses embodied in Section 125. The focus is not on the direct a¤ect of the subsidy on medical spending, but on the e¤ects it might have on the nature of insurance policies employers o¤er.
Identifying the e¤ect of FSAs on health insurance choices is important for two reasons. First, it improves our understanding of trends in coverage rates over time and the likely e¤ects of tax policy changes on insurance coverage. The 4 Any unused funds in the FSA are forfeited at the end of the year, inducing individuals …rst to be realistic when making initial FSA allocations, and second to accelerate expenditures near the end of the year if by then health expenses have turned out to be smaller than expected. (Recent proposals by the U.S. Administration include allowing $500 of unused FSA contributions to be rolled over to subsequent years without penalty.) Despite these nonlinearities in the subsidy regime, in most of this paper we treat the deduction of out-of-pocket expenses as open-ended. 5 The Joint Committee on Taxation of the US Congress (Joint Committee on Taxation, 2003) reports tax expenditures for cafeteria plans, to which contributions for both medical care and dependent care expenses can be made, amount to an estimated $17 billion in 2004. second reason is more normative. If, by subsidizing out-of-pocket expenditures, FSAs induce further over-consumption of medical care, then their e¤ect will be to exacerbate the distortion associated with the existing subsidy to premiums. But FSAs could induce individuals to purchase plans with higher nominal coinsurance rates. If the plan characteristics respond enough to the subsidy, then e¤ective (i.e., net-of-subsidy) coinsurance rates could increase.
If this FSA e¤ect increases net coinsurance rates, it can (partially) correct the distortion introduced by the premium subsidy. Even though individuals would face higher out-of-pocket expenses, they would be better o¤. This possibility was …rst identi…ed by Jack and Sheiner (1997) , and is supported by our empirical work, which uses data on health insurance plans and FSAs from a national survey of employers in 1993 (coupled with information from the NBER's TAXSIM model).
We estimate the e¤ect of an employer o¤ering an FSA on the coinsurance rate associated with the employer's health plan(s). We use IV techniques to account for selection e¤ects (more generous employers are likely to both provide "better" insurance (lower coinsurance rates) and to o¤er FSAs). Our estimates suggest that FSAs increase the coinsurance rate for the average health care plan by 7.3 percentage points. This is large, since the average coinsurance rate for the sample of all …rms is about 17 percent. Not only is the nominal coinsurance rate higher in the presence of FSAs, but the e¤ ective (net-of-subsidy) coinsurance rate is also higher, by about 2 percentage points. This suggests that FSAs may well be welfare-improving, due to the presence of the distortionary premium subsidy.
Insurance choice in the presence of FSAs
In this section we summarize the model of Jack and Sheiner (1997), which informs our empirical research. We start by recalling that a fully e¢ cient insurance policy equalizes an individual's expected marginal utility of income across uncertain states of nature. Ideally, the implied redistribution across states would be a¤ected via lump-sum state contingent transfers. In practice income is transferred to states of high health needs (bad states) by paying for incurred costs. However, this can lead to over-consumption of care (i.e., moral hazard), so insured individuals are often required to share some of the costs of care, even in bad states (Pauly, 1968) . Such cost sharing exposes the individual to some risk, but reduces the costs associated with moral hazard.
Jack and Sheiner characterize this trade-o¤ in a simple model in which insurance contracts are characterized by a premium and a coinsurance rate -the latter being the proportion of incurred medical costs that must be paid out-ofpocket by an individual. Consider then a world where individuals face uncertain health care needs. A simple way to model this is to assume that the cost or price of improving health is uncertain, and is represented by a parameter 2 [ 0 ; 1 ]. Thus, if H is an individual's level of health and C is his consumption of other goods, then his expenditure is C + H. To attain the same level of health, an individual with worse health status i.e., higher , must spend more, H, on medical care. 6 The representative consumer's (state-independent) utility is U (C; H). Income, denoted by W , is exogenous and …xed. Given a coinsurance rate of and premium P , in health state a consumer chooses health and consumption by solving the following problem:
Demand for health is denoted H( ; W P ), and demand for the consumption of other goods is C( ; W P ). Indirect utility is V ( ; W P ) = U (C( ; W P ); H( ; W P )).
The consumer chooses and P to maximize his expected utility, ( ; P ), subject to the insurer's zero pro…t condition:
where is distributed according to the cdf F (:). After rearranging and applying Roy's identity (see Jack and Sheiner, page 209), the optimal coinsurance rate satis…es
where q H is health spending, and V 2 is the marginal utility of income, both of which are state-dependent. Bars denote means. The left hand side is a measure of the expected utility cost of a marginal increase in the coinsurance rate, holding health expenditures in each state, q, constant. The right hand side is the corresponding marginal bene…t of such an increase, deriving from the premium savings associated with reduced consumption of medical care when the coinsurance rate rises. Figure 1 illustrates the optimal choice of insurance contract. In this …gure, expected utility is increasing towards the origin.
is the zero pro…t locus (which need not be a straight line). When the coinsurance rate is one, there is no insurance, so the premium is zero. The premium is highest when the individual is fully insured against medical costs ( = 0). Assuming ( ; P ) is well-behaved, the optimal coinsurance rate is simply characterized by the …rst order condition (2), located at point A and denoted .
The e¤ects of the subsidy to the purchase of insurance arising from the exclusion of employer and employee premium payments can best be anticipated by focusing on the net premium, e P = P (1 ), where is the individual's
Thus determines the productivity of health inputs. If input prices are p, then the minimum cost of attaining health H in state is c(H; ) = p H. If p is normalized to unity, can be interpreted as the price of health.
Coinsurance rate, κ
The optimal insurance policy marginal income tax rate. The zero pro…t constraint faced by insurers can be written, in terms of the net premium, as
where q is a function of the coinsurance rate and the individual's income net of insurance premiums and taxes paid. This net income, in turn, is W e P + T , where T is a lump-sum tax used to …nance the subsidy. In Figure 2 the vertical axis measures the total ex ante payment associated with the purchase of health insurance, e P + T . The e¤ect of the subsidy is thus to ‡atten and shift the zero pro…t line in Figure 1 .
7 ;8 The zero pro…t line in the presence of the premium subsidy is denoted . The optimal choice of insurance policy (at point B) must still lie on the old zero pro…t line , but at a point where the individual's indi¤erence curve is tangent to . As long as the individual's preferences over and e P + T are well behaved, the subsidy induces individuals to choose more generous insurance, < (see Jack and Sheiner, Proposition 1). Naturally, Optimal insurance when premiums are subsidized at a rate this premium subsidy, …nanced by a lump-sum tax is welfare-reducing, because it distorts individuals'incentives to purchase e¢ cient health insurance policies.
Finally, if out-of-pocket expenditures are also subsidized, say at a rate , then the zero pro…t line rotates and shifts once again, this time as shown in Figure 3 to . In this …gure, as before, the net premium (plus lump-sum tax) is shown on the vertical axis, while now the net coinsurance rate e = (1 ) is shown on the horizontal axis. The zero pro…t condition, in terms of e P and e , is e
The e¤ect of the -subsidy is to steepen the budget line compared with , simply because a change in net coinsurance rate of de corresponds to a larger change in the gross rate, d = de =(1 ), which generates a correspondingly larger change in the premium. (Again, think of q as being …xed and compare conditions 3 and 4.) The optimal insurance policy (point C) again must lie on the old zero pro…t line , but at a point where the individual's indi¤erence curve is tangent to . As drawn in Figure 3 , the e¤ect of the subsidy to out-of-pocket payments is to increase the optimal coinsurance rate by so much that the net coinsurance rate, e rises above that prevailing under the premium subsidy regime alone, e . This result relies on consumer preferences over (e ; e P + T ) being su¢ ciently wellbehaved -in particular, indi¤erence curves must become successively steeper as we move down the original budget line. Jack and Sheiner (Proposition 2)
Coinsurance subsidy -increases net coinsurance rate -improves welfare Figure 3 : Optimal insurance when premiums are subsidized at a rate and coinsurance payments are subsidized at a rate show that if the demand for health care is inelastic with respect to the out-ofpocket price, then a small coinsurance subsidy, > 0, does in fact induce such a change in the net coinsurance rate. In sum, FSAs can partially undo the negative e¢ ciency e¤ects of premium subsidies. However, it is also possible that indi¤erence curves in (e ; e P + T )-space could become steeper near the top of the original budget line. In this case, the -subsidy would induce a lower choice of net coinsurance rate, and would be welfare-reducing. The measured e¤ect of FSAs on net coinsurance rates can thus be used to assess the welfare e¤ects of the tax policy.
Data and Empirical Strategy
The previous section demonstrates two important potential consequences of the growth of ‡exible spending accounts. First, the increasing subsidy to out-ofpocket expenses could explain part of the nominal shift in health care costs from employers to employees. It would be ironic if public policy were in part accountable for this phenomenon that has, rightly or wrongly, generated so much concern. Second, it is possible that the incremental subsidy to out-of-pocket expenses, in the form of FSAs, mitigates the welfare loss from the underlying subsidy to premiums. As illustrated by Figure 3 , the resulting shift towards insurance policies with higher coinsurance rates and lower premiums would be e¢ ciency enhancing so long as the net coinsurance rate with the subsidy in place is higher than the gross coinsurance rate would have been without the subsidy.
Data
To investigate these issues empirically we use the 1993 Employer Health Insurance Survey (EHIS) from the Robert Woods Johnson Foundation. The EHIS is a cross-section of …rm-level data on health insurance plans o¤ered by employers in 10 U.S. states. The survey has two parts. The …rst has information about health insurance plans, including their coverage, premiums, and coinsurance rates. The second part contains information about the …rms, including their industrial classi…cations, employees, payrolls, unionization rates, and organizational forms.
We focus on a subsample of the EHIS comprising 6525 …rms that o¤er health insurance to their employees, have payrolls per worker greater than the full-time minimum wage ($8160), and o¤er at least one insurance plan that is not an HMO or a PPO. In this sample, 25.8 percent of the plans are associated with …rms that o¤er employees access to FSAs, and the …rms o¤er a total of 7391 di¤erent insurance plans. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for these data. Consistent with our expectations based on section 2, health insurance plans o¤ered by …rms with FSAs have lower premiums and higher coinsurance rates. Of course, plans associated with FSAs also di¤er in many other respects. They are more likely to cover certain services, and the …rms that o¤er them have more and better-paid employees, have been in existence longer, and are less likely to be unincorporated and for-pro…t. 9 The key determinant of the value of the FSA subsidy, and of the welfare consequences of FSAs, is the marginal income tax rate faced by the plan's members, . Since we do not know the true marginal tax rates faced by each plan's members, we use the NBER TAXSIM model to construct a proxy. First we compute the average earned income per worker for each …rm, and we assume this constitutes these employees'entire income. We then let TAXSIM compute the federal and state marginal tax rates by assuming that all workers are single tax payers with no dependents, and standard deductions. These calculated average marginal tax rates vary across health plans due to di¤erences in …rms' payrolls and in states' marginal tax rates. As table 1 shows, individuals with health plans associated with FSAs have higher estimated marginal tax rates. Table 1 shows that health plans associated with FSAs have higher coinsurance rates, lower premiums, and members that are likely to face higher marginal tax rates. To ask whether FSAs may have caused the increase in employee outof-pocket payments, and whether the net after-tax coinsurance rate is higher than the gross rate would be without the FSA subsidy, we need to control for di¤erences between …rms with and without these accounts.
Empirical strategy
Ideally, we would like to assess the e¤ect of subsidizing out-of-pocket expenses (o¤ering an FSA) on the average health care plan's coinsurance rate. Estimating this average treatment e¤ect faces two distinct problems, one relating to endogenous regressors, and the other to selection e¤ects.
First, since coinsurance rates and premiums are structurally related through the zero pro…t constraint (illustrated in …gure 1), an econometric model that hopes to identify the e¤ect of FSAs on coinsurance rates must control also for premium di¤erences across plans, among other characteristics. However, the observed variation in premiums is unlikely to be exogenous, and a simple OLS estimate of the premium e¤ect may be biased, thereby contaminating the estimate of the FSA e¤ect. Instead, we estimate a reduced form where the coinsurance rate is estimated as a linear function of exogenous variables that a¤ect premiums, some of which should not in theory a¤ect the coinsurance rate. These include state indicator variables (to account for regional health care cost di¤erences), plan coverage, …rm size and unionization rates.
The second obstacle to estimating whether coinsurance rates are higher for …rms with FSAs is that …rms'decisions to o¤er FSAs are not exogenous. Some …rms may simply have better employee bene…ts than others. These "good" …rms may have more generous health insurance plans, lower coinsurance rates, FSA programs, and a host of other unmeasured attributes. An unmeasured characteristic such as this, which is correlated with both the propensity to o¤er FSAs and to have low coinsurance rates, will likely bias any estimate of the impact of FSAs on coinsurance rates against …nding a positive e¤ect. In other words, for the average …rm, adopting an FSA could in theory cause it to have higher coinsurance rates. But …rms that have adopted FSAs are the generous ones, which also have lower coinsurance rates. A simple regression of coinsurance rates that fails to account for the endogenous decision to adopt an FSA will likely understate the positive e¤ect of FSAs on coinsurance rates.
To control for the endogeneity of FSAs, we use the procedure outlined in Heckman and Robb (1985) for dealing with discrete endogenous variables. We …rst estimate a probit of whether or not the …rm has an FSA, and we include in that regression a set of instruments that are not included in the determinants of coinsurance rates. These instruments include the …rm's age, whether the …rm has plants located in other states, whether the …rm has local competitors, and the percentage of the …rm's employees eligible for health insurance. These …rm characteristics predict the likelihood of a …rm o¤ering an FSA, but are not related to the coinsurance rates of employees.
To illustrate our approach, suppose we were to ignore all information except for plan coinsurance rates and availability of an FSA. Estimating the average treatment e¤ect would then amount to a simple comparison of means. Formally, we would assume that coinsurance rates are determined by the following equations:
The (5) and (6) 
where , " 0 and " 1 are vectors, F is a vector of dummy variables equal to 1 if the plan has an FSA and zero otherwise, and ( 1 0 ) is the average treatment e¤ect we are interested in Of course, as discussed above, coinsurance rates will likely depend on premiums, and a range of other covariates. Thus we replace (5) and (6) with the pair of equations
where
) is a set of exogenous variables, including the constant 1. Following our discussion above, X does not include premiums, but does include variables we expect to in ‡uence premiums but not coinsurance rates directly. Note that the error terms ( 0 ; 1 ) are smaller than those in equations (5) and (6), because we have removed the components of the error that are explained by observables, X. As above, we can then combine equations (8) and (9) into
We make two alternative parametric assumptions in estimating the treatment e¤ect. Our …rst approach is to restrict all the components of 0 and 1 to be equal, except for the intercept, that is,
j for all j > 0. This assumption means that the treatment e¤ect is independent of the observable characteristics X, and that the error terms in (8) and (9) are identical,
i for all i. We can thus ignore the interactive part of the error term in (10) and rewrite it as = X + F +
where the parameter = ( 1 0 0 0 ) is the treatment e¤ect we are interested in. We still cannot estimate (11) using OLS, because corr(F; ) 6 = 0. Remember, unobserved characteristics of …rms that make them likely to provide generous bene…ts including FSAs and low coinsurance rates will bias estimates of . Instead, we predict the binomial indicator F using a probit regression, including variables Z not included in X. We then use the predicted probabilities as instruments in (11) .
Our second speci…cation weakens the ignorability of treatment assumption inherent in (11) , as well as the assumption that 0 = 1 in equation (10) . If 0 6 = 1 , the interaction e¤ect in (10) does not disappear, and IV will not consistently estimate . We continue to assume that in the absence of an FSA the conditional expectation of a plan's coinsurance rate is a linear function of observable covariates. However, we now allow the treatment e¤ect itself to be related to the covariates. This amounts to assuming that
where e 0 and e 1 are mean-zero errors, and all components of 0 and 1 are free to di¤er. Note that the error terms here (e 0 ; e 1 ) are smaller still than those in (8) and (9), because we will now be allowing the e¤ect of an FSA to be di¤erent depending on the covariates, X. We can then rewrite (12) and (13) as
where 1 0 . Finally, we assume that e 0 = e 1 , which involves a weaker assumption on the error terms than assuming 0 = 1 in (11). To facilitate interpretation of the results, we rewrite (14) as
where = X , is the average treatment e¤ect (or more precisely, the treatment e¤ect at the average value of the covariates). We estimate (15) instrumenting for F . In sum, the methodology is as follows. First we estimate P (F SA = 1jX; Z) by a probit, where Z is a vector of instruments. Second, we estimate one of two second-stage equations using instrumental variables:
In both cases, F is a dummy variable for plans associated with FSAs, (or ) is the average treatment e¤ect, and X is a vector of …rm and plan characteristics.
The di¤erence between equations (16) and (17) is that (17) includes interactions between the FSA dummy and the di¤erence between the covariates and their means. As instruments we use the age of the …rm, dummy variables for whether the …rm has out-of-state locations or in-state competitors, and the percentage of employees eligible for health insurance. Firm age works well as an instrument because older …rms are more likely to o¤er FSAs, but it is di¢ cult to imagine reasons why older …rms should have di¤erent coinsurance rates from newer …rms. We include a dummy variable for multi-state …rms, because they might have economies of scale in administering payroll programs such as FSAs, and on the theory that having a¢ liates in multiple states is more likely exogenous than the level of employment. A dummy variable for the presence of in-state competitors captures the degree of local labor market competition, putting pressure on companies to provide bene…ts such as health insurance and FSAs. Finally, the percentage of the …rm's employees eligible for health insurance should increase the …rm's tendency to administer an FSA. Table 2 presents the results of this …rst-stage probit, which estimates the probability that a …rm o¤ers an FSA. The unit of observation is a …rm-speci…c health insurance plan. The …rst …ve covariates listed in table 2 are the instruments, Z, and are excluded from the second stage regressions of coinsurance rates. Health insurance plans are more likely to be associated with …rms that o¤er FSAs if those …rms are older, have more employees eligible to participate in health insurance bene…ts, have locations in multiple states, and have local competition. Each 10 years of …rm age adds about 1.5 percentage points to the probability that a …rm o¤ers an FSA. Each 10 percent increase in the share of employees eligible for health insurance adds about 1 percentage point to the probability of o¤ering an FSA. And having no identi…ed competitors subtracts about 8 percentage points from the probability of o¤ering an FSA. These …rm characteristics are clearly correlated with the probability that the …rm o¤ers an FSA. Our assumption, tested below, is that they are uncorrelated with the error term in equations (16) and (17).
Turning to the exogenous covariates in table 2, each 10 percent increase in our estimate of employees'marginal tax rates increases the probability of a …rm o¤ering an FSA by 3 percentage points. Each 10 percent increase in the fraction of female employees increases the FSA probability by 0.6 percentage points. Plans associated with non-pro…t …rms are 8 percentage points more likely to have FSAs. The more bene…ts a plan o¤ers, the more likely it is to be associated with an FSA. Prescription drug coverage increases FSA probabilities by 3 percentage points; alcoholism coverage increases it by 7 percentage points; and maternity bene…ts by 11 percentage points.
Some characteristics decrease the probability that a …rm o¤ers an FSA. A 10 percent increase in union membership decreases the FSA probability by 0.5 percentage points. A 10 percent increase in the fraction of workers 55 or older decreases the FSA probability by 1.5 percentage points. Unincorporated …rms are 5 percentage points less likely to o¤er FSAs.
Firms in mining and manufacturing, and transport and communications, are more likely to have FSAs than the omitted industry, agriculture. Firms in North Dakota are more likely to have FSAs, while in other states are less likely to have FSAs than the omitted state, Colorado.
Our next step is to use the predicted probabilities of a plan being provided in conjunction with an FSA, using the coe¢ cients in table 2, in an IV estimation of equations (16) and (17). Table 3 presents our central estimates of equations (16) and (17). As a benchmark, column (1) presents a simple OLS version of (16), not accounting for the selection by …rms as to whether or not to o¤er an FSA. The dependent variable is the coinsurance rate, expressed as a number between 0 and 100. The coe¢ -cient on the FSA dummy indicates that health insurance plans associated with …rms that o¤er FSAs have coinsurance rates that are 0.74 percentage points greater than otherwise similar plans without FSAs. Though the coe¢ cient is statistically signi…cant and in the direction we expect, the magnitude is quite small.
Results
Column (2) of table 3 runs the same OLS speci…cation, but includes interactions between the FSA dummy and the di¤erence between each of the …rm and insurance-plan characteristics and its mean, as in equation (17). Because the interaction included is di¤erences-from-means, we can interpret the FSA coe¢ cient (1.365) in the same way as when the interaction was not included, as an average treatment e¤ect. Here the average treatment e¤ect has risen as a result of including the interactions, from .74 to 1.36, but it is still a small change.
Of course, the decision to o¤er an FSA is not exogenous, and may be based on unobserved …rm characteristics that also a¤ect the coinsurance rates. In fact, we suspect that the OLS results in columns (1) and (2) understate the true e¤ect of FSAs on coinsurance rates, because …rms that have adopted FSAs are the ones that have generally more generous bene…ts, including low coinsurance rates. Hence, we do not put too much emphasis on these …rst two benchmark columns.
Column (3) of table 3 shows the results of an instrumental variables estimation of equation (16), using the predicted probabilities from table 2 as instruments. The average health care plan has a coinsurance rate that is 4.07 percentage points higher when o¤ered in conjunction with an FSA than in the absence of and FSA, controlling for observable characteristics of …rms, and for the selection by …rms as to whether to o¤er an FSA. The average coinsurance rate in the sample is 17 percent, so a 4 percent increase amounts to a substantial average treatment e¤ect. (More on magnitudes below.)
In column (4) of table 3 we estimate equation (17) using IV, including interaction terms between the predicted FSA probability and the di¤erence between the exogenous variables and their means. While few of the interactions are individually statistically signi…cant, an F -test rejects the joint hypothesis that all of these interactions have zero e¤ect on coinsurance rates. In other words, the covariates X have di¤erent overall e¤ects on coinsurance rates depending on whether the health insurance plan is associated with an FSA. Omitting the interactive terms as in (15) biases the results in column (3). The average treatment e¤ect reported in column (4) of table 3 is 7.3 percentage points. When provided in conjunction with FSAs, plans have coinsurance rates that are 7.3 percentage points higher than in the absence of FSAs.
At the bottom of column (3) we report the F -statistic from a Wu-Hausman test of the exogeneity of the FSA regressor in column 1, easily rejecting unbiasedness and consistency for the OLS approach. Note also that the coe¢ cients in columns (3) and (4) are larger than their OLS versions in columns (1) and (2), suggesting that the endogeneity of FSAs biases the OLS approach against …nding a large average treatment e¤ect. To interpret the size of this e¤ect more concretely, we turn to an explicit discussion of magnitudes.
Magnitudes and welfare implications
In the theory illustrated in …gure 3, the subsidy to out-of-pocket costs increases the optimal coinsurance rate by so much that the net coinsurance rate rises above what it would have been absent the subsidy. Under the assumptions of inelastic demand for health care made by Jack and Sheiner (1997), subsidizing out-of-pocket costs increases the net coinsurance rate in this way, and is e¢ ciency enhancing in the presence of a pre-existing premium subsidy.
To assess whether in fact the net coinsurance rate rises as a consequence of FSAs, consider the relationship between the predicted gross and net rates, evaluated at the means of the covariates. The predicted gross coinsurance rate with FSAs is simply the predicted gross rate without FSAs plus the average treatment e¤ect, , measured in column (4) of table 3 as 7.3 percentage points.
The net coinsurance rate is just the gross rate times (1 ) for plans with FSAs (where is the average marginal tax rate faced by individuals in those plans), and the gross rate itself for plans without FSAs,
where net rates are denoted by a~. The di¤erence between the predicted net coinsurance rates of a plan with the average covariates with and without an FSA is de…ned as e = e 1 e 0 :
In the top panel of table 4 we present estimates of e . Using our speci…cation from table 3, column (4), the expected net coinsurance rate in the presence of an FSA is 17.0 percent (column (2)), while without an FSA it is 15.1 percent (column (3) ). The di¤erence, e , is 1.9 percentage points.
In other words, even though an FSA lowers the net coinsurance rate by subsidizing out-of-pocket expenses, insurance contracts adjust so as to raise the gross coinsurance rate by enough to more than o¤set the subsidy. The end result of the subsidy is that employees pay a higher share of medical costs out of pocket. As drawn in …gure 3, the subsidy to out-of-pocket costs is therefore e¢ ciency-enhancing.
Robustness
In our main estimate, in column (4) of table 3, state dummy variables serve multiple purposes. They capture all of the unobserved characteristics of states that a¤ect coinsurance rates. Our primary purpose for including them is as a measure of health care costs, which appear to di¤er substantially across states. To try to capture health care cost di¤erences more directly, in our …rst robustness test we include a measure of state health care costs instead of state dummies.
State health costs come from the Prospective Payment System (PPS), a part of the reimbursement calculation for Medicare that contains data on physicians' total remuneration and total physicians' hours. We use this to calculate an hourly reimbursement rate for physicians' time, which we take as a measure of health care costs in each state. In row (2) of table 4 we report the FSA coe¢ cient ( ) from a version of equation (17) where this hourly doctor cost is included as a covariate. Substituting this proxy for health costs in lieu of our state dummies does not alter the estimated average treatment e¤ect of FSAs. If anything it raises the estimate (from 7.3 to 8.3).
As a second robustness test, in row 3 of table 4 we report the predicted e¤ect of FSAs on coinsurance rates if we use a linear probability model to predict FSA choice at the …rst stage, instead of a probit. The estimated e¤ects are little a¤ected by this change in speci…cation.
A …nal set of robustness checks uses alternative sets of instruments for predicting FSAs. Recall that the instruments used in table 2 include (i) the …rm's age, (ii) the percent of employees eligible for health insurance, (iii) whether the …rm has locations in other states, and (iv) whether the …rm has a competitor in state. In the bottom panel of table 4 we report the average and net treatment e¤ects for alternative sets of instruments, where each alternative involves dropping one of the original set. The estimates are all similar, and result in large, statistically signi…cant average treatment e¤ects. Moreover, each estimate results in a predicted positive average net treatment e¤ect, suggesting that FSAs have caused an e¢ ciency-enhancing increase in the employees'share of employer-provided health care costs.
Conclusions.
Individuals with private health insurance in the United States have been paying an increasing share of their health care expenses out of pocket over the last decade. While this is likely due to a number of determinants (demographics, falling tax rates, changes in the organization of health care delivery, etc.), one factor that may be important is the growth of ‡exible spending accounts, which subsidize out-of-pocket payments. The potential role of this subsidy suggests that the observed shift to uninsured expenses may be partly …ctional -net of the subsidy, out-of-pocket expenses might have actually fallen.
In this paper, we have used cross-sectional data from an employer survey to address the link between the availability of FSAs and coinsurance rates. Of course, without panel data we cannot be de…nitive about the recent evolution of insurance arrangements in the US. Nevertheless, the cross-sectional analysis is instructive. We …nd, for example, that when health insurance is o¤ered in conjunction with an FSA, the coinsurance rate is higher. Correcting for selection bias, the FSA e¤ect is statistically signi…cant and economically large: coinsurance rates are on average about 7.3 percentage points higher with FSAs than without (compared to a sample average of 17 percent). In addition, our results suggest that the shift to out-of-pocket spending is real, as the net-ofsubsidy coinsurance rate is about two percentage points higher for plans o¤ered in the presence of FSAs.
Finally, we believe there is a curious irony in the gap between our …ndings here and the public concern about shifting health care costs from employers to employees. First, it is ironic that public policy in the form of FSAs is accountable for part of the transfer of costs to employees. Second, the fact that the shift is large enough to outweigh the subsidy (FSAs cause net coinsurance rates to rise) means that the shift in costs may be welfare enhancing, rather than being a cause for concern. There is a strong presumption that exposure to more risk, through higher (real) out-of-pocket costs, is welfare-reducing. In this case, however, FSAs may be welfare-increasing, since they (partially) o¤set the distortionary e¤ect of the tax subsidy given to employer-paid health insurance premiums. Of course, reforming the tax treatment of employer-provided health insurance directly would more e¢ ciently correct this distortion. Absent such a policy, FSAs may indeed be welfare-improving. Robust standard error in parenthesis. *, † significant at 5% and 10% level, respectively Note: the standard errors in column (4) do not account for the covariance between κ i 1 and κ i 0 and are too large. This will be corrected in a subsequent draft.
